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WHY THE U.S. CLAIMS COURT IS NOT A VIABLE
VENUE FOR FARMERS: THE U.S. CLAIMS COURT'S
HANDLING OF AGRICULTURAL CASES, 1980-1990
Alexander J. Pires, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of federal programs are administered by the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture (USDA) in which qualifying farmers contract
with the USDA to receive monetary or other assistance. If the USDA's
selection or eligibility process denies a farmer due process or is other-
wise arbitrary, or the farmer is allowed to participate and signs a con-
tract but the contract is breached by the U.S.D.A., the farmer may
seek administrative remedies. If the administrative process fails to
grant the farmer relief, he may seek review in one of two courts, the
U.S. Claims Court or the U.S. District Court.
This article shows that review in the U.S. Claims Court is often
futile. Section II summarizes the USDA contract programs available to
farmers; Section III explains how the USDA regulates contract pro-
grams and issues determinations; Section IV (a) analyzes the U.S.
Claims Court's jurisdiction and scope of review, (b) reviews the agri-
cultural cases decided by the U.S. Claims Court 1980-1990, and (c)
compares those decisions with recent decisions issued by U.S. district
courts.
The article concludes that a farmer is advised to seek the jurisdic-
tion of and remedies from a U.S. district court, rather than the U.S.
Claims Court.
II. USDA CONTRACT PROGRAMS PROVIDING SUBSIDIES OR
ASSISTANCE TO FARMERS
There are many federal programs that provide direct or indirect
subsidies or assistance to farmers. This section provides a brief sum-
mary of the major programs,1 most of which are administered by the
* Partner with the firm of Conlon, Frantz, Phelan, Knapp & Pires, a Washington, D.C. law
firm with a specialized practice in agricultural law and litigation. Ms. Shelley Bagoly provided
substantial. assistance in researching and writing this article.
1. Price support programs; commodity loans; payments; purchases by the Commodity
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USDA's Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS).
USDA farm program payments each year constitute billions of
dollars. For example, in 1989 (one of the more modest years), the
USDA paid more than $9.3 billion to some 1.5 million farmers or farm
entities (partnerships and corporations).' Because of farmers' reliance
on these programs, disputes between the government and farmers are
common, resulting in administrative hearings before the ASCS or other
departments of the USDA, some of which lead to litigation in the
United States Claims Court or district court.
A. Price Support Programs
Through price support programs, the USDA establishes minimum
price levels for crops and minimum income levels for farmers.3 The
USDA controls crop production through quotas. Cropland set-aside,
acreage limitations, and land diversion payments are three methods
used to limit farm production and are mandatory for feed grains,4 cot-
ton, wheat, rice,5 soybeans, peanuts, tobacco, honey, milk, sugar beets,
and sugar cane.' Consequently, the majority of crop farmers in
America receive price support benefits. Farmers who agree to grow
wheat, feed grains, cotton and/or rice also sign contracts entitling them
to deficiency payments.7
A third program involves disaster benefits. After widespread natu-
ral disasters, farmers may apply for relief on the major price support
program crops.8 For example, in the 1989 disaster program, a farmer
could receive up to $250,000 in disaster payments.' Accordingly, both
Credit Corporation; Conservation Reserve Program; Disaster Assistance Programs; Payment-in-
kind Program; Dairy Termination Program; Milk Diversion Program; Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation; Farm Credit Act Program, which is actually independent of USDA; Agricultural
Conservation Program; and Emergency Conservation Program. Excluded from this summary are
Farmers Home Administration Loan Programs and localized special contract programs.
2. Agriculture Payments/Effectiveness of Efforts to Reduce Farm Payments Has Been Lim-
ited, GAO/RCED-92-2, at 22 (December 1991).
3. Neil E. Hari, AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL, § 10.03, at 10-9 (1991).
4. Feed grains include corn, grain sorghum, barley, oats, and rye. 7 U.S.C. § 1442d (1988).
5. Hari, supra note 3, § 10.03, at 10-9.
6. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1428(c), 1441, and 1446 (1988).
7. Calculated at a rate not to exceed the difference between a prearranged target price and
the market price. 7 U.S.C. § 1445 (1991).
8. Hari, supra note 3, § 10.03, at 10-20. These crops include wheat, feed grains, upland
cotton, and rice. Id.
9. 7 U.S.C. § 1308(2)(A) (1988). On December 12, 1991, Congress passed the Dire Emer-
gency Supplemental Appropriations and Transfers for Relief From Effects of Natural Disasters,
Other Urgent Needs, and for Incremental Costs of Desert Shield/Desert Storm Act of 1992, Pub.
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the eligibility of a farmer and the maximum payments he could receive
have been the subject of litigation. Finally, diversion payments are also
made available to the farmer when the USDA limits production of cer-
tain program crops such as rice and upland cotton.1"
B. Commodity Loans
Farmers can contract for nonrecourse loans using eligible com-
modities as security." Applications are made to the farmer's county
ASCS office. Once eligibility is established, the farmer signs a promis-
sory note and gives his crop as collateral.' 2 When the loan matures, and
is not paid in full, the crop collateral may be forfeited to the USDA; if
the USDA sells the commodity for less than the loan amount, the de-
faulting farmer is not liable for the difference in price. 3
C. Purchases by the Commodity Credit Corporation
The USDA, through the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC),
also purchases wheat, feed grains, and rice 4 as well as other crops'" to
assist in maintaining crop prices.
D. Conservation Reserve Program
Congress implemented a conservation acreage reserve program
(CRP) in 1986.16 Under the program, the Secretary of Agriculture
contracts with landowners or operators of "highly erodible cropland" to
remove land from crop production. The total annual acreage to be con-
served is limited. 17 The program is popular (since 1986 over 34 million
L. No. 102-229, 105 Stat. 1701 (1991), a combined disaster program for crop years 1991 and
1992.
10. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1441-2(e), 1444-2(e) (1988).
11. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1441-2 (1988), rice; 1444-2 (1988), upland cotton; 1444(h) (1988), long
staple cotton, 1444(f) (1988), feed grains; 1445b-3a (1988), wheat; there are also provisions for
peanuts, tobacco, oilseeds, honey, and sugar.
12. 7 C.F.R. §§ 1421.6(a) and 1421.2 for wheat, feed grains, soybeans, farm-stored pea-
nuts, and farm-stored flue-cured tobacco and 1436.6 and 1434.1 for honey.
13. 7 U.S.C. § 1425 (1988).
14. 7 U.S.C. §9 1441 and 1444d (1988).
15. 7 U.S.C. §9 1441(b), 1446(b), and 1446(d) (1988). These other products included pea-
nuts, honey, and dairy products.
16. 16 U.S.C. § 3831 (1988) and 7 C.F.R. § 704.5 (1992). The 1990 Farm Bill added
CRP-related programs. The Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-624, 104 Stat. 3359 (1990).
17. During the 1986 crop year, the total reserve acreage was to be no less than 5 million
acres and no more than 45 million acres. In each crop year since 1986, the minimum has in-
1993]
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acres have been placed in the CRP"8), even though the requirements a
farmer has to meet to remain eligible are strict. The farmer forfeits
rights to payment if the requirements are violated.19 The CRP program
and rules have been the focus of continuous administrative disputes
with the ASCS, and the focus of landmark litigation on farmers' rights
to fair administrative hearings.2"
E. Disaster Assistance Programs
The Disaster Assistance Act of 198821 combined the Emergency
Feed Program2" and the Emergency Feed Assistance Program23 to pro-
vide additional disaster assistance. These programs also allowed farm-
ers to receive payment for crop losses "because of drought, hail, exces-
sive moisture, or related condition in 1988.1124 The Disaster Assistance
Act of 198925 supplemented the 1988 law by furnishing feed grains
through dealers and manufacturers or by authorizing use of feed grain
pledged as collateral for CCC loans.2" The 1989 Act authorized pay-
ments for crop losses from "damaging weather or related condition in
1988 or 1989,"27 including "drought, hail, excessive moisture, freeze,
creased to 15, 25, 35, and 40, respectively (1988, 1989, and 1990). 16 U.S.C. § 3831(b) (1988).
18. R. Feist and P. Villa-Lobos, "USDA Announces Final Results of 10th Conservation
Reserve Program Signup," U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Office of Public Affairs, Office of Press and
Media Relations, News Division (Nov. 13, 1991).
19. 16 U.S.C. § 3832 (1988) and 7 C.F.R. § 704.12 (1992).
20. Esch v. Lyng, 665 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1987), discussed infra.
21. Pub. L. No. 100-387, § 101, 102 Stat. 925 (1988), adding 7 U.S.C. § 1471 (1988).
22. This program provided fifty percent of cost-sharing for feed needed by eligible livestock
producers.
23. This program provided for purchase of government-owned feed grains at certain
percentages.
24. Id. § 201. There were other provisions in the 1988 Disaster Assistance Act including the
"Soybeans and Sunflowers" provision, § 301(a), authorizing farmers to plant soybeans and sun-
flowers on not less than ten percent or more than twenty-five percent of their wheat, feed grain,
upland cotton, extra long staple cotton, and rice acreage without affecting their bases for those
crops. Another provision stated that for land under the CRP on which hay was harvested in 1988,
CRP payments would not be reduced if a farmer could show that additional conservation practices
were carried out. Finally, the Act contained a provision authorizing the Department of the Inte-
rior to supply "water users and others" on a temporary basis with water or canal capacity at
existing federal reclamation projects, and to make loans to water users to relieve loans resulting
from drought conditions in 1987, 1988, and 1989.
25. Pub. L. No. 101-82, § 202, 103 Stat. 581 (1989).
26. Id. § 201. Funding was also given for livestock transportation assistance and livestock
water development projects. Id. §§ 202, 203.
27. Id. §§ 101(a)(l) (for program participants), 102(a)(1) (for program nonparticipants),
103(a)(1) (for peanuts, sugar and tobacco), and 104(a)(l) (for soybeans and nonprogram crops).
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tornado, hurricane or excessive wind, or any combination of those
weather conditions."12 8 Hundreds of administrative appeals have been
made from 1988 and 1989 disaster applications. In 1991, Congress
passed the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Trans-
fers for Relief From the Effects of Natural Disasters, for Other Urgent
Needs, and for Incremental Costs of "Operation Desert Shield/Desert
Storm" Act of 1992 which entitled farmers to apply for disaster assis-
tance for crops for years 1991 and 1992.29
F. Payment-in-kind Program
The popular Payment-in-kind (PIK) Program, implemented in
1983, provided for land to be diverted from the production of wheat,
feed grains, cotton, and rice.3" The reduction in production raised
prices, again benefitting the farmer, who was paid in-kind.
G. Dairy Termination Program
The Dairy Termination Program (DTP) 1 authorized the Secre-
tary of Agriculture (beginning April 1, 1986 and ending October 1,
1987) to pay milk producers to slaughter dairy cattle.3 2 The contract
required the producer to stay out of the "d~iry business" for five years
and imposed serious penalties for violations. Because many dairy farm-
ers participated and "sold out" their livelihood, administrative disputes
and litigation continue, despite the cessation of the program five years
ago.
H. Milk Diversion Program
The Milk Diversion Program 3 came from the Dairy Production
Stabilization Act of 1983, 3" by which the USDA entered into contracts
with producers of milk to reduce the quantity of milk marketed for
28. Id. § 112(a)(l). Farmers who received 1989 disaster assistance, emergency loans, or
forgiveness of advance deficiency payments were required to purchase federal crop insurance for
their 1990 crops.
29. Pub. L. No. 102-229, 105 Stat. 1701 (1991).
30. 49 Fed. Reg. 2227 (1984).
31. 7 U.S.C. § 1446(d)(3) (1988). ASCS administered this program by regulations pub-
lished at 7 C.F.R. §§ 1430.450-1430.470 (1986).
32. 7 U.S.C. § 1446(d)(3)-(7) (1988).
33. Id. § 1446(d).




commercial use during a fifteen-month period beginning on January 1,
1984.11 The producer agreed to reduce milk production during the con-
tract period.36 Penalties for breaching the contract included forfeiture
of payments and marketing penalties. 7
I. Federal Crop Insurance Corporation
Congress passed the Federal Crop Insurance Act"8 "to promote
the national welfare by improving the economic stability of agriculture
through a sound system of crop insurance. . . ."" The Federal Crop
Insurance Corporation provides insurance against loss of crops or crop
damage. 0 The underlying statute provides that, in the event a claim
for indemnity is denied, the farmer can seek relief in the United States
district court for the district in which the insured farm is located. 4
Accordingly, these cases are not brought in the United States Claims
Court, and are not discussed further in this article.
J. Farm Credit System Loans
The farm credit system has a long history of lending farmers
money, originating with the Farm Credit Act of 1933.41 After many
legislative overhauls, the farm credit system is now administered by the
Farm Credit Administration (FCA), an independent agency. 43 Farm
credit banks are cooperatives owned by farmers. Although not a federal
program, there is an administrative review process." If unsuccessful,
35. Id. Congress gave the Secretary the discretion to modify these contracts if the Secretary
determined (i) there would be an excessive reduction in the level of milk production in the United
States, or (ii) there had been a substantial hardship to producers of beef cattle, dairy cattle, hogs,
or poultry sold for slaughter. 7 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (1988).
36. 7 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (1988).
37. Id.
38. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1501-28 (1988).
39. Id. § 1502.
40. 7 U.S.C. § 1508(a) (1988). The commodities eligible to be insured are set forth at 7
U.S.C. § 1518 (1988) and include wheat, cotton, flax, corn, dry beans, oats, barley, rye, tobacco,
rice, peanuts, soybeans, sugar beets, sugar cane, tomatoes, grain sorghum, sunflowers, raisins, or-
anges, sweet corn, dry peas, freezing and canning peas, forage, apples, grapes, potatoes, timber
and forests, nursery crops, citrus, and other fruits and vegetables, nuts, tame hay, native grass,
agricultural species or any other agricultural commodity, excluding livestock and stored grain,
determined by the Board.
41. 7 U.S.C. § 1508(c) (1988).
42. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1138f (1933).
43. Harl, § 11.01[2], p. 11-27.
44. 7 C.F.R. §§ 1900.51-1900.100 (1988).
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farmers have usually litigated farm credit disputes in state courts (ex-
cept for diversity cases). Similar suits in federal court have been con-
sistently rejected on the grounds that there is no private right of
action.45
K. Agricultural Conservation Program
The agricultural conservation program46 shares with qualified
farmers and ranchers the costs of approved conservation and environ-
mental protection practices. "7 Farmers must obtain approval by both
the county ASCS committee and the state ASCS committee."8 The
contract may be annual or long-term.49
L. Emergency Conservation Program
The emergency conservation program5" allows farmers and ranch-
ers to receive cost-sharing assistance for rehabilitating lands damaged
by wind erosion, floods, hurricanes, or other natural disasters, and for
implementing water conservation measures during severe droughts. 5
County ASCS committees determine eligibility on an individual basis
considering the type and extent of damage and the farmer's capability
(financial and otherwise) to rehabilitate the damaged farmland. 52
M. Summary of Programs
The USDA limits total farm subsidies payable to each farmer.
Section 1001 of the Food Security Act of 1985"' limits the total
amount of payments that a "person" can receive under the annual pro-
grams for wheat, feed grains, upland cotton, extra long staple cotton,
and rice to $50,000. The law also places a $250,000 per person limit on
all types of program payments. 54 The 1990 Farm Bill extended these
45. Four federal circuits have found no private right of action under the Farm Credit Act.
Schroder v. Volcker, 864 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1988); Redd v. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis, 851
F.2d 219 (8th Cir. 1988); Bowling v. Block, 785 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1986); Smith v. Russellville
Production Credit Assoc., 777 F.2d 1544 (11th Cir. 1985).
46. 16 U.S.C. §§ 590a-590q-3 (1935).
47. 7 C.F.R. § 701.30 (1980).
48. 7 C.F.R. §§ 701.14, 701.11 (1982).
49. Id. § 701.15(a).
50. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2205 (1978).
51. 7 C.F.R. §§ 701.46, 701.47 (1978).
52. Id. § 701.54.




limits through 1995 program crops and added a third limit of $75,000
on marketing loan and loan deficiency payments, 5 which, like the
$50,000 limit, comes under the $250,000 maximum.
The payment limitation regulations, including the definition of the
term "person," were originally set forth in 7 C.F.R. Part 795. On Au-
gust 5, 1988, new payment limitation regulations were promulgated. 6
Every year, each farmer, farming partnership, or farming corpora-
tion includes in his, her, or its application to the county committee a
request to be determined as one or more "persons." The right to par-
ticipate in the farm program and to be determined as one or more
"persons," is part of an administrative process which begins at the local
level. The following section explains the nature of the review process.
III. How THE USDA REGULATES CONTRACT PROGRAMS AND
ISSUES ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS
The USDA implements most federal farm subsidies and assistance
programs.6 7 Within the USDA, the CCC, through the Commodity
Credit Corporation Charter Act, oversees the programs. 58 As stated
earlier, administration of the programs is carried out by the ASCS.59
Farmers learn about contract programs from their local ASCS of-
fice. Each office has a local ASCS committee consisting of volunteer
farmers (elected by other farmers in that county) and headed by a sal-
aried county executive director. Together, they approve or disapprove
each farmer's application for participation in the farm programs.60 If a
farmer's application is denied, he appears before his county committee
for an informal hearing. At these informal hearings,61 the farmer at-
tempts to explain his right to participate in the program, or to receive
55. Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§
Illl(a)(l)(B), llll(a)(I)(C), llll(a)(2)(A), 104 Stat. 3497, 3498; 7 U.S.C. §§ 1308(1),
1308(2) (1988).
56. 7 C.F.R. § 1497 (1992). These new regulations were authorized by the Agricultural
Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-23, 101 Stat. 1330. For an excellent article on pay-
ment limitations, see Christopher R. Kelley and Alan R. Malasky, Federal Farm Program Pay-
ment-Limitation Law: A Lawyer's Guide, 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 199 (1991).
57. As noted, supra, the farm credit system loans are privately held and thus not adminis-
tered by USDA. Federal Crop Insurance is administered by the Federal Crop Insurance
Corporation.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 714c(g) (1948).
59. 7 C.F.R. §§ 2.21, 2.65 (1972).
60. 16 U.S.C. § 590h (1933).
61. The hearings before the county (and later, state and national) committees are not "ad-
judications" pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556.
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assistance, or to be determined a certain number of "persons" for pay-
ment limitation purposes. At these hearings, the Government does not
present any testimony or other evidence but states that it will rely upon
the farmer's oral testimony and the administrative record (generally,
the letters to and from the farmer) to make its final determination.62
The county committee then issues a written determination.
If a farmer disagrees with the written county determination, he
can have a reconsideration hearing before the full county committee. 63
If again denied, he can appeal to his state ASCS committee," which
consists of farmers from the state, selected by the Secretary. Should he
again lose, until late 1991 he could appeal to the Deputy Administra-
tor, State and County Operations (DASCO). 65 In 1991, the USDA es-
tablished a new appeals division, called the National Appeals Division
(NAD), pursuant to section 1132 of The Food, Agriculture, Conserva-
tion, and Trade Act of 1990.66 Because of delays within ASCS, NAD
was not created until November 25, 1991.67 NAD promises to provide
a more formal and equitable review process. For example, until NAD
became law, the farmer had no right to request discovery. 68
Farmers receiving unfavorable final determinations may seek re-
view in either the U.S. Claims Court or a U.S. district court. The
USDA's longstanding position is that farmers must appeal all program
cases to the U.S. Claims Court,69 and not in U.S. district courts. The
USDA's overwhelming success in the U.S. Claims Court, as explained
below, justifies this preference.
IV. APPEALS OF AGRICULTURE CASES INVOLVING CONTRACTS
WITH FARMERS TO U.S. CLAIMS COURT, 1980-1990
A. Jurisdiction and Scope of Review
Two similar statutes provide jurisdiction in the United States
62. What is placed in the official "administrative record" becomes critical when the case is
appealed to the U.S. Claims Court. See infra section IV A.
63. 7 C.F.R. § 780.3 (1991).
64. Id. § 780.7(b).
65. Id. § 1421.2.
66. Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 1132, 104 Stat. 1388-11 (1990).
67. 26 C.F.R. § 780 (1991). The interim regulations were issued on November 25, 1991.
68. NAD's interim regulations provide some mandatory and some discretionary right to
discovery.




Claims Court for claims against the United States: 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The statutes read as
follows:
Section 1346(a)(2):
Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not
exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution,
or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department,
or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for
liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort, ex-
cept that the district courts shall not have jurisdiction of any civil
action or claim against the United States founded upon any express or
implied contract with the United States or for liquidated or unliqui-
dated damages in cases not sounding in tort which are subject to sec-
tions 8(g)(1) and 10(a)(1) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978. For
the purpose of this paragraph, an express or implied contract with the
Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Navy Exchanges, Marine
Corps Exchanges, Coast Guard Exchanges or Exchange Councils of
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall be consid-
ered an express or implied contract with the United States.
Section 1491(a)(1):
The United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to render
judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either
upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an
executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with
the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases
not sounding in tort. For the purpose of this paragraph, an express or
implied contract with the Army and Air Force Exchange Service,
Navy Exchanges, Marine Corps Exchanges, Coast Guard Exchanges,
or Exchange Councils of the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration shall be considered an express or implied contract with the
United States.
Under section 1346(a)(2), district courts and the U.S. Claims
Court are vested with concurrent jurisdiction for claims less than
$10,000; under section 1491, the U.S. Claims Court's jurisdiction is
exclusive. In sum, there are two jurisdictional rules: (1) the U.S.
Claims Court has jurisdiction over all claims against the government
for breach of contract, and (2) district court jurisdiction terminates
whenever claims exceed $10,000.
Whether a dispute between a farmer and USDA over subsidy pay-
ments is a breach of contract dispute or a dispute over eligibility, or
[Vol. 15:223
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whether the denial was the result of an arbitrary or capricious act can
be critical. The Government (through United States attorneys, who
handle suits in U.S. district courts, or Justice Department attorneys,
who handle suits in the U.S. Claims Court) usually argues that dis-
putes over farm subsidies are Tucker Act7" breach of contract suits
rather than suits for administrative procedural review and therefore
must be heard in the U.S. Claims Court. The purpose of such an argu-
ment is to keep these cases out of U.S. district courts. Administrative
review cases raise issues of due process and equity-the province of
U.S. district courts in which jurisdiction, scope of review, and relief are
more liberal, and therefore more pro-farmer. Beginning with the Farm
Bill of 1985, when subsidy payments became a substantial part of most
farmers' incomes and litigation became more prevalent, the government
became more insistent on this position.71
Because suits in excess of $10,000 are within the exclusive juris-
diction of the U.S. Claims Court, agricultural lawyers wanting to keep
their clients in a U.S. district court began in the late 1980s to plead for
injunctive and declaratory relief. Since the U.S. Claims Court has no
jurisdiction over these remedies, suit could be filed in a district court.
The USDA complained that these suits for "equitable relief' were suits
for money damages in disguise since restraining suspension of subsidy
payments could lead to payments in excess of $10,000. Nevertheless,
U.S. district courts have consistently ruled, beginning with Esch v.
Lyng,72 that claims for injunctive and declaratory relief resulting in
payments are not necessarily suits for "money damages."
The USDA also prefers to defend subsidy cases in the U.S. Claims
Court rather than federal district courts because of the U.S. Claims
Court's precedent that its scope of review is limited to deciding whether
the USDA's denial of benefits had a "rational basis." In that limited
context, U.S. Claims Court judges address only questions of law and do
not hold trials. They decide all cases on motions for summary
judgment.73
Summary judgment assumes that the administrative record is
70. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2) and 1491(a)(1) are generally referred to as the Tucker Act.
71. In each of the last six suits filed by the authors in 1989-1990 in U.S. district courts, the
government moved that the case be transferred to the U.S. Claims Court. The government's mo-
tions were denied.
72. 665 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1987), affd as modified sub nom. Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d
976 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
73. Carruth v. United States, 627 F.2d 1068, 1076 (1980).
19931
UALR LAW JOURNAL
complete and fairly reflects the evidence in the case. Because the ASCS
county and state administrative hearings are so informal, however,
most administrative records lack key documentary evidence and often
contain no testimony. Since farmers are not allowed to cross-examine
witnesses or obtain discovery at county or state hearings, the adminis-
trative record can be one-sided, incomplete, and misleading. In the past
four years, all five cases brought by the authors on behalf of farmers in
U.S. Claims Court were scheduled for disposition by court-ordered
summary judgment motions, even though in four of those cases, counsel
for plaintiffs sought discovery to supplement the administrative record.
In contrast, federal district courts often examine the evidence and
policy behind the specific farm program under a broader scope of re-
view and in a manner similar to Administrative Procedures Act prece-
dents.7 4 U.S. district court judges often look beyond the initial adminis-
trative record, allow testimony and admission of new evidence not
found in the administrative record, allow evidence on the issue of
granting injunctive or declaratory relief, and carefully analyze whether
the farmer was granted a fair and impartial due process administrative
hearing consistent with the U.S. Constitution. Throughout this process
they often give credence to the farmer's prior denial of a due process
hearing at the county and state level. Consequently, the USDA always
seeks transfer of larger federal farm program cases to the U.S. Claims
Court, where the court is less inclined to undertake such an exhaustive
analysis. 5
The U.S. Claims Court's limited scope of review also precludes
issues involving equitable standards. In Pope v. United States,6 the
court admitted it had no jurisdiction to hear a farmer's claim based on
an equitable relief provision.7 7 Moreover, when a contract dispute in-
volves allegations of error in the USDA administrative procedure, the
farmer needs an historical and careful analysis of the facts by the re-
viewing court. This is not always available in U.S. Claims Court.
These claims for denial of due process, suits for declaratory judg-
ments, or requests for injunctive relief78 are outside the scope of review
of the Claims Court. The need to obtain injunctive relief or a declara-
74. The Administrative Procedures Act is found at 5 U.S.C. § 551-576 (1966).
75. Divine Farms, Inc. v. Block, 679 F. Supp. 867, 868 (S.D. Ind. 1988); Gibson v. Block,
619 F. Supp. 1572, 1575 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
76. 9 Cl. Ct. 479 (1986).
77. Id. at 485.
78. Morgan v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct. 247, 253 (1987).
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tory judgment, however, is often critical to a farmer trying to avoid
bankruptcy or a date-certain land foreclosure. Traditionally, hearings
for preliminary injunctions involve testimony of witnesses who provide
the court with evidence not in the administrative record. Finally, com-
plaints seeking injunctive relief often seek declaratory judg-
ments-rulings as to the respective rights between the parties, includ-
ing a farmer's right to receive certain payments. Yet, as stated by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Esch v.
Yeutter, the U.S. Claims Court "lacks the general equitable powers of
the district court . . . . " and cannot entertain these actions.
8
1
These limitations on review make the U.S. Claims Court a poor
choice for a farmer needing timely review of administrative error, an
emergency injunction, declaratory judgment, or supplementation of the
administrative record.
As shown in the next section, the U.S. Claims Court has also sel-
dom granted relief to farmers. When relief has been granted, it has
been limited to a remand of the case to the USDA. The court has the
authority, pursuant to its jurisdictional statute, "to remand appropriate
matters to any administrative or executive body or official with such
direction as it may deem proper and just." 81 The court implements this
remand power by sending ASCS cases back to the USDA for further
hearings, usually in the form of additional fact finding. This is a far
less meaningful remedy than a granting of injunctive or declaratory
relief.
Examples of cases in which remands to USDA were ordered by
the court (all of which are discussed in section IV B infra) include:
Hilo Coast Processing v. United States82 (instructing the agency to re-
examine the record, supplement it, and state reasons why plaintiffs
should or should not be treated differently from other sugar cane grow-
ers); O'Connell v. United States8" (ordering the agency to permit the
farmer to present evidence on her damages consisting of benefits she
79. Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1989) modifying Esch v. Lyng, 665 F.
Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1987).
80. Id. at 983. In addition to the limited scope of review, bringing suit in claims court can
also create delays since a farmer cannot file for relief until after USDA's payment deadline
passes. This delay can be harmful since prompt receipt of payments is essential to many farmers'
existence.
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) (1978).
82. 7 Cl. Ct. 175 (1985).
83. 14 CI. Ct. 309 (1988).
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was qualified for under the program); and Stegal v. United States84
(requiring the agency to address specific questions and articulate its
rationale for its decision on each question).
B. U.S. Claims Court Agricultural Decisions, 1980-1990
In the decade 1980 to 1990, the U.S. Claims Court issued deci-
sions in thirty agricultural cases.85 A review of these cases presented,
generally, in chronological order reveals that farmers obtained mean-
ingful relief in only a few cases, and even in those cases, the relief
granted was minimal.
In two consolidated cases known as Carruth v. United States,8
peanut farmers challenged the authority of the Secretary of Agricul-
ture to reduce or withhold (in 1973-1977) price support from these
peanut crops. They alleged breach of contract, and that a department
regulation known as the "24-hour rule" denied them due process of law
and violated constitutional equal protection safeguards. Plaintiffs fur-
ther contended that defendant's eligibility procedures were arbitrary
and capricious. The court ruled on cross-motions for summary judg-
ment, and as to the issue of the testing procedures for segment 3 pea-
nuts, the cross-motions were denied, and the issue remanded to the trial
division for trial or other disposition. 7 The portion of defendant's mo-
tion which involved a laches defense was also denied. Defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment was granted on all other issues, and plain-
tiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment was denied. Entry of final
judgment in the case was deferred pending a determination of the test-
ing procedure issue on remand.
88
During 1981, in Hawks v. United States,89 plaintiff sued for com-
pensation under a herd depopulation contract with the USDA. Defend-
ant moved for summary judgment. Defendant's regulations facilitate
the control and eradication of contagious diseases among livestock.
Plaintiff contracted with defendant whereby plaintiff agreed to slaugh-
84. 19 Cl. Ct. 765 (1990).
85. There are a few other cases, including those involving USDA employees, which are not
included in this review-McGrath v. United States, I Cl. Ct. 236 (1982) and Hedman v. United
States, 21 Cl. Ct. 385 (1990). These cases involved employees who challenged their employer's
decision to terminate their employment with the agency, and as such are irrelevant to this article.
86. 627 F.2d 1068 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
87. Id. at 1083.
88. Id. The authors were unable to determine whether the plaintiffs prevailed on remand.
89. 226 Ct. Cl. 707 (1981).
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ter his herd of cattle with the expectation of receiving indemnities. De-
fendant claimed depopulation of the entire herd never occurred. The
court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment because it
found the case could not be decided as a matter of law on the uncontro-
verted facts before the court and remanded the case to the trial division
for further proceedings.90 There is no recorded case as to whether the
farmer prevailed on remand.
In 1982, the court ruled on two cases involving the Beekeeper In-
demnity Payment Program, Hoffland v. United States,9 and Jim's
Valley Apiaries, Inc. v. United States.92 In the first case, plaintiff
sought payment for damages to his bee colonies. Defendant moved for
summary judgment, and the court granted defendant's motion. Plaintiff
claimed that the use of poisonous chemicals for economic purposes in
the area caused him losses of sizable numbers of his honey bees. The
court found plaintiff had no implied or express contract with defendant
which would create an obligation for defendant to pay plaintiff in spite
of failure to appropriate funds. Furthermore, the court dismissed plain-
tiff's claims against defendant for willful or negligent behavior, as those
claims sound in tort, and the court found them beyond its jurisdiction,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491. 93 In the second case, Jim's Valley Apia-
ries, Inc., the court also granted defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, based on its finding in Hoffland, since plaintiff was in a similar
factual posture. 9'
In Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. United States,9" decided in 1983,
sugar beet processors who participated in the 1977 price support loan
program were found to be entitled to recover costs of storing sugar be-
cause the regulations prohibiting the accounting method they used were
not clear. This case was originally brought in the U.S. Court of Claims,
where plaintiffs prevailed on summary judgment. Defendant appealed
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit which affirmed the
claims court's decision, finding that plaintiff appellees were entitled to
their recovery despite the finding that they used an accounting method
under the loan program which was different than the method they used
90. Id. at 711. This case was heard before the U.S. Court of Claims (predecessor to the
U.S. Claims Court) which had both a trial division and an appellate division.
91. 231 Ct. Cl. 922 (1982).
92. 231 Ct. Cl. 995 (1982).
93. Hoffland, 231 Ct. Cl. at 922-24.
94. Jim's Valley Apiaries, Inc., 231 Ct. Cl. at 995.
95. 770 F.2d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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when they participated in an earlier payment program. 96 The Federal
Circuit further found that the regulation prohibiting the exchange of
accounting methods applied only to the payment program and not to
the loan program.
In Pettersen v. United States97 the USDA's determination that
farmers were ineligible for the 1984 feed grain program (because they
allegedly erroneously reported the planted and approved conservation
reserve acreage) was upheld on cross-motions for summary judgment.
The court further found that it was statutorily precluded pursuant to
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 193898 from reviewing DASCO's
refusal to grant equitable relief to plaintiff farmers. As explained, in-
fra, there have been many cases in U.S. district courts where this use
of 7 U.S.C. § 1385 by the USDA has been rejected. 99
The government's determination of a farmer's ineligibility for the
1983 PIK program was found not arbitrary or capricious in Gibson v.
United States.100 The court found the farmer had forced a tenant off
land so that he could participate in the program and had failed to ex-
haust his available administrative remedies. The court further held that
the federal statute making determinations by the Secretary of Agricul-
ture final and conclusive, 7 U.S.C. § 1429,101 did not prevent the claims
court from having jurisdiction over plaintiff's challenge of the USDA's
decision, but noted its review power was limited. The court opined it
had the authority to examine the Secretary's decision only to determine
whether the Secretary had acted "rationally" and within his statutory
96. Id. at 1043-44.
97. 10 Cl. Ct. 194 (1986).
98. 7 U.S.C. § 1385. This provision states:
The facts constituting the basis for any . . . payment under the wheat, feed grain,
upland cotton, extra long staple cotton, and rice programs . . . when officially deter-
mined in conformity with. the applicable regulations prescribed by the Secretary or the
Commodity Credit Corporation, shall be final and conclusive and shall not be review-
able by any other officer or agency of the Government.
99. Compare this refusal to review the denial of equitable relief to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Arizona's ruling in Golightly v. Yeutter, 780 F. Supp. 672 (D. Ariz.
1991), where the court not only reviewed USDA's denial of equitable relief but found the denial
an abuse of discretion.
100. 11 Cl. Ct. 6 (1986).
101. 7 U.S.C. § 1429 (1949) states:
"Determinations made by the Secretary under this Act shall be final and conclusive: Provided,
That the scope and nature of such determinations shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of




authority. 02 Secondly, the court held that while factual determinations
by the USDA are unreviewable under 7 U.S.C. § 1385, the court could
review the legal conclusions based on the Secretary's determination of
those facts, and was not prevented from judicial review of questions of
law or of allegations and proof that the Secretary's decision was arbi-
trary or capricious. 03 This type of analysis became the standard ap-
proach used in many of the USDA cases before the U.S. Claims Court
in the late 1980s.
Haupricht Brothers, Inc. v. United States0 4 involved farmers
found ineligible for the 1983 PIK program by the agency. The court
affirmed the agency decision on cross-motions for summary judgment.
The court found the evidence which the agency relied on reasonable,
including the findings that no producer could or did devote any part of
the farm to an approved conserving use (required of the producers and
operators who entered the 1983 program), and that none of them oper-
ated or produced crops on the farm during the 1983 crop year. 05 Plain-
tiffs originally brought this case in the U.S. District Court for the East-
ern District of Michigan, but that court concluded that it did not have
subject matter jurisdiction and transferred the case to the claims
court. 06 The court held that while it had no broad equitable powers to
grant plaintiffs some of the relief they sought, it had the authority to
determine whether the Secretary acted beyond his statutory authority
or whether he denied plaintiffs their procedural rights. The claims
court found that there was no genuine issue of material fact essential to
the disposition of the case, and that the defendant was entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law.
In Hilo Coast Processing, Co. v. United States,10 7 the claims court
granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, but remanded the
matter to the agency for further administrative action. Plaintiff sugar
cane growers had brought the action challenging an agency determina-
tion denying coverage to part of their 1977 sugar crop under the sugar
price support program. The court held the USDA's refusal to amend
the regulation providing for price support payments for cane and beet
102. 11 CI. Ct. at 11.
103. Id. at 14.
104. 11 CI. Ct. 369 (1986).
105. Id. at 374.
106. Haupricht Brothers, Inc. v. United States, No. 84CV-7405-AA (E.D. Mich. May 6,
1985).
107. 7 CI. Ct. 175 (1985).
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sugar growers was improper in light of the different treatment of simi-
larly situated sugar cane growers. That the regulation was rational
when it was first promulgated was not a controlling factor. 08 The
agency was instructed in the court's order to review the record and
supplement that record as it saw fit and then to state the reasons why
plaintiffs should or should not be treated differently from the other
growers." 9 The U.S. Claims Court heard the matter again after the
Secretary released its supplemental determination of July 22, 1985.
The court released an unpublished order of September 27, 1985, at
which time it held against plaintiffs on cross-motions for summary
judgment, finding that defendant's decision was not arbitrary and ca-
pricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law in light of defendant's supplemental decision.' Therefore, the
court authorized the Secretary to retain payments which plaintiffs
sought. On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed,"' finding plaintiffs eli-
gible for payment under the 1977 sugar crop price support payment
program. The Federal Circuit further held that the internal transfer of
raw sugar to refinery operations constituted "marketing" under the
program regulations, so that plaintiffs were eligible to receive program
payments."1 The court concluded that although the Secretary of Agri-
culture's determinations are entitled to substantial deference, these de-
terminations cannot be inconsistent with what Congress clearly in-
tended and that plaintiffs were treated unjustly because they had been
singled out for special and seemingly unfair treatment." 3
Plaintiff's case in Morgan v. United States"" was dismissed when
the court held plaintiff's submission of an application to participate in
the 1984 milk diversion program was insufficient to create an implied-
in-fact contract entitling plaintiff to program benefits and the court's
jurisdiction. The application was treated by the court as an "offer" by
plaintiff to contract with defendant, not plaintiff's "acceptance" of an
offer from defendant.
In an action for breach of a 1983 PIK program contract, Raines v.
United States,"1 plaintiffs sought relief in the form of wheat, diversion
108. Id. at 194.
109. Id. at 194-95.
110. For a summary of the unpublished opinion, see 816 F.2d at 633.
111. 816 F.2d 629 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
112. Id. at 633.
113. Id. at 634.
114. 12 CI. Ct. 247 (1987).
115. 12 CI. Ct. 530 (1987).
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payments, and treatment and storage costs. The court granted defend-
ant's motion to dismiss. With regard to jurisdiction, the court found it
had the authority to address plaintiffs' claim for money under breach
of PIK contract theory, but plaintiffs' claim for wheat due under the
original contract term was outside the claims court's "incidental equi-
table powers" under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2), " and could not be con-
strued as a claim for a money judgment. The court upheld the agency's
decision revising the downward PIK compensation because the original
contract terms were based on defendant employee's erroneous calcula-
tion, which needed to be corrected by defendant. Plaintiffs failed to
show that defendant employee's error was purposeful or that plaintiffs'
reliance on the error was reasonable. The court noted that the sections
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act providing that facts constituting
the basis for payment under these programs shall be final and conclu-
sive"1 did not preclude judicial review of plaintiffs' allegation that the
PIK contract was breached by the administrative decisions, because,
even accepting the factual findings of the agency as conclusive, the
question of whether the facts gave rise to a breach of contract was a
legal, rather than a factual, determination.
Hanson v. United States'1 8 involved allegations by dairy farmers,
pursuant to FmHA regulations, of breach of an implied-in-fact con-
tract. The court found no cause of action for money damages under
regulations and statutes implementing emergency agricultural loans
and stated the recognition of a damages remedy would not further the
purpose of making loans available to applicants who could not obtain
credit elsewhere. As in many prior cases, the court held it had no juris-
diction of plaintiff's due process claims. The court found a valid basis
for the agency's denial of the loan and also rejected plaintiff's argu-
ment that defendant be estopped from denying an implied-in-fact
116. To provide an entire remedy and to complete the relief afforded by the judgment,
the court may, as an incident of and collateral to any such judgment, issue orders di-
recting restoration to office or position, placement in appropriate duty or retirement
status, and correction of applicable records, and such orders may be issued to any ap-
propriate official of the United States. In any case within its jurisdiction, the court shall
have the power to remand appropriate matters to any administrative or executive body
or official with such direction as it may deem proper and just. The Claims Court shall
have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim by or against, or dispute with, a
contractor arising under section 10(a)(l) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978.
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) (1988).
117. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1385, 1421 (1988).




Willson v. United States"' involved the 1985 price support and
production adjustment programs for wheat and barley. The court found
the ASCS decision (in which plaintiffs were determined to be one "per-
son") to be "rationally based." The county committee had found plain-
tiffs eligible for payments as separate "persons," but the state commit-
tee overruled that decision. The court affirmed the decision of the state
committee as having a reasonable basis in the administrative record.
The court held that the state committee was not precluded from re-
viewing the county committee's determination on its own initiative and
not equitably estopped from determining plaintiffs' eligibility upon
completion of the production contracts where plaintiffs could not show
they had changed their position and suffered any injury after the
county committee's determination of their "person" status. The court
also accepted defendant's position that the county committee's decision
in favor of the farmers had been made in contravention of federal
regulations.
In a 1984-85 milk diversion program case, O'Connell v. United
States,"' the court found no breach of contract by defendant when
defendant rejected plaintiff's application for participation in the milk
diversion program, even though the county committee had already ac-
cepted the application. The court ruled the agency's finding (that pro-
duction from plaintiff's husband's cows was production from plaintiff's
unit for purposes of determining plaintiff's eligibility) not arbitrary and
capricious. The court noted that damages recoverable for improper de-
nial of eligibility for the program would be limited to benefits for which
plaintiff was qualified. Plaintiff would be unable to recover consequent-
ial damages resulting from the sale of cows which plaintiff claimed she
was forced to sell after being denied participation in the program. The
court also pointed out that the plain language of the contract between
plaintiff and defendant reserved defendant's right to deny a farmer's
request for payment under the program based upon any failure to qual-
ify under the regulations. The court noted, however, that while the
agency determined that the dairy cows belonging to plaintiff's husband
had to be included within plaintiff's contract reduction, neither plaintiff
nor the agency ever calculated what that reduction would be at any
119. Id. at 534.
120. 14 CI. Ct. 300 (1988).
121. 14 CI. Ct. 309 (1988).
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point in the administrative process. Because the court found the record
silent on this point, the case was remanded to the agency for the pur-
pose of allowing plaintiff to present her data on what the new calcula-
tion would be. The remand inst'uctions required the agency to render a
decision as to whether plaintiff met her contract reduction taking into
account the new calculation.
In another milk diversion program case, Grav v. United States,
1 22
farmers alleged that the USDA promulgated regulations inconsistent
with the program's statutory scheme and won on cross-motions for
summary judgment. Under the milk diversion program, the Secretary
was required to enter into contracts for payment of money to any pro-
ducer who qualified for the program. The court found that an implied-
in-fact contract existed, and, therefore, the court had jurisdiction to
hear the case. The court found that plaintiffs did not improperly
"transfer" cattle after the date specified in the statute, even though the
buyer picked up the cattle and paid for them after that date. Under
South Dakota law, title passed at the time and place of the contracting
which was prior to the specified date in the statute. Not surprisingly,
defendant appealed this decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.12 3 The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the claims
court's jurisdiction and its decision granting plaintiffs' participation in
the program, concluding that the statute governing the program gave
the Secretary no discretion to refuse participation to any qualified ap-
plicant, qualified as a money-mandating statute and, thus, triggered
Tucker Act jurisdiction in the claims court.
In Swartz v. United States"4 plaintiff farmers sought review of
defendant's decision denying them refunds of monies paid to the Com-
modity Credit Corporation under the 1982-83 commodity price support
program. The court, ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment,
held plaintiffs were not entitled to refunds based upon the bankruptcy
of the grain elevator involved and that defendant's denial was rational
and within statutory authority.
A civil penalty had been assessed against milk producers in Parks
v. United States1 26 for knowingly violating provisions of the 1984-85
milk diversion program. The agency found the producers had engaged
in a "scheme or device tending to defeat the purpose of the program."
122. 14 CI. Ct. 390 (1988).
123. Gray v. United States, 886 F.2d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
124. 14 CI. Ct. 570 (1988).
125. 15 C1. Ct. 183 (1988).
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On appeal to the U.S. Claims Court, the producers challenged their
termination from the program. The court upheld the agency's "scheme
or device" finding and granted defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment. The court concluded that past payments under the program were
recoverable by defendant and that the scienter necessary for imposing
the civil penalty could be imputed to plaintiffs. While the record did
not contain evidence that plaintiffs concealed the existence of the
agreement, the court found plaintiffs could be charged with the knowl-
edge of the basic operation of the program, so that they should have
reasonably known that their agreement defeated the purpose of the
program. The court noted that it can grant affirmative, non-monetary
relief only if that relief is associated with and subordinate to a claim
for a money judgment. Interestingly, as to plaintiffs' claim for declara-
tory relief, the court found that it was not bound by the label plaintiffs
used and that the declaratory relief was unnecessary since it was dupli-
cative of plaintiffs' claim for money damages.
In Chavez v. United States,12 plaintiff contractor sought damages
to recover costs of replacing portions of an irrigation line pursuant to
oral contract with defendant for construction of the line, which had
been requested by the Soil Conservation Service and the ASCS. The
court denied defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that it had jurisdic-
tion over a contract implied-in-fact but not a contract implied-in-law,
the latter being one in which there exists no agreement between the
parties, but a duty is imposed by law to prevent injustice. A contract
implied-in-fact requires the same contractual elements as those re-
quired for an express contract: mutuality of intent, offer, acceptance,
consideration, and lack of ambiguity. A contract with the United
States can only be established if it is entered into with a government
agent with direct authority to obligate funds of the United States. The
court also found that an issue of material fact existed as to whether a
federal officer or employee was present at a meeting which gave rise to
the oral contract for construction work at issue. The court held plaintiff
could raise a new issue in response to defendant's motion to dismiss
which addressed two agencies' authority to enter into the contract in
support of its motion: that both government agencies requested plaintiff
to perform the repair work on the irrigation line which formed the ba-
sis for the suit. The court gave plaintiff the option to elect to continue
with the litigation by filing an amended complaint within thirty days.
126. 15 CI. Ct. 353 (1988).
244 [Vol. 15:223
AGRICULTURAL LAW
The court noted that it can employ equitable doctrines incidentally to
its general monetary jurisdiction to arrive at money judgments or to
arrive at substantial principles upon which a money judgment may be
based.127
Farmers in Durant v. United States,28 claimed breach of contract
against the ASCS for failure to make feed grain payments under the
1985 price support and production adjustment programs. The court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and rejected plain-
tiffs' promissory estoppel claim, finding such a claim not within the
court's jurisdiction. The court further found plaintiffs failed to demon-
strate an equitable estoppel claim and could not demonstrate the mutu-
ality of intent necessary to support a finding of a unilateral contract.
The court noted that plaintiffs, as participants in the ASCS programs,
were charged with a knowledge of the applicable regulations. These
regulations informed all farmers involved in the programs that determi-
nations of the county and state committees were not binding on defend-
ant and that the federal administrator could modify or review any such
determination. Throughout the 1980s, defendant, with the assistance of
the U.S. Claims Court, consistently and successfully argued that its
county and state determinations, even when in favor of the farmer,
were not binding on DASCO. With the passage of The Food, Agricul-
ture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990, however, Congress required
that all rulings of county and state committees be final and binding if
not reviewed by DASCO (now NAD) within ninety days. The interim
regulations released on November 25, 1991, reflect this new ninety-day
rule, but grant exceptions if it is later determined that the farmer's
actions were not in good faith or were based upon misrepresentation,
false statements, fraud, or wilful misconduct.
By 1989, the increase in agricultural litigation and the occurrence,
as shown below in section IV D, of pro-farmer decisions in district
courts around the country, incited hope that the U.S. Claims Court
might also be more liberal with its authority. Frank's Livestock &
Poultry Farm, Inc. v. United States"2 9 dispelled those hopes. Farmers
alleged, among other things, constitutional violations which did not
state claims for monetary relief against the United States; plaintiff's
due process claims were essentially that plaintiff had no prior notice as
127. This quasi-equitable authority is found at 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) (1988).
128. 16 CI. Ct. 447 (1988).
129. 17 CI. Ct. 601 (1989).
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to the agency determinations. The court found that the ASCS proce-
dure of sending a letter notifying plaintiff of noneligibility and provid-
ing for a subsequent redetermination hearing did not violate any appli-
cable due process standard. The court further opined that it had no
jurisdiction over the constitutional claims, other than the taking claim
under the Fifth Amendment. The court held that plaintiff had no
"property interest" in obtaining farm-stored loans, so that it could not
support a "taking" claim against defendant based on the agency's de-
nial of the loan applications. Plaintiff also asserted a "Bivens" claim, 30
over which the court likewise found no jurisdiction. In sum, plaintiff's
claim for wrongful denial of benefits due under the 1985 grain reserve
and price support programs was denied by the court which found a
rational basis for the decision in the record and hearings sufficient to
satisfy due process.
Even when the USDA loses a case in U.S. Claims Court, the
court's view of its very limited powers can provide USDA an opportu-
nity to redeem itself. In Stegall v. United States 3' two partnerships
sought review of a "one-person" determination regarding the 1986
farm subsidy program. A key issue in the case was which regulation
applied (chapter 7, part 795.3 or chapter 7, part 795.7 of the Code of
Federal Regulations) to plaintiffs. The court denied both parties' mo-
tions for summary judgment and stated that it could not resolve the
issues of the case without more complete factual findings, remanding
the case to the USDA. The court ordered that specific questions be
addressed by DASCO and ordered DASCO to make explicit factual
findings on each of the questions and articulate its rationale for the
decision. DASCO did so on remand and again denied plaintiffs any
relief. 13 1 In sum, the court granted DASCO an opportunity to clean up
its earlier defective determination. While this may not be uncommon in
other judicial reviews, it is often devastating to a farmer who long prior
to the review signed a contract and perhaps spent the money under
contention.
In Pender Peanut Corp. v. United Staies,'"3 defendant contended
that plaintiff peanut handler failed to dispose of peanuts pursuant to
130. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
131. 19 CI. Ct. 765 (1990).
132. The authors have been unable to determine whether plaintiffs again appealed to the
U.S. Claims Court.
133. 20 Cl. Ct. 447 (1990).
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defendant's applicable statutes and regulations under the peanut price
support program. Consequently, defendant imposed a penalty on plain-
tiff; plaintiff sued, arguing that defendant assessed the penalty without
authority. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court held de-
fendant lacked statutory authority to impose monetary penalties for
mishandling of "additional," as opposed to "quota," peanuts. The court
further rejected defendant's argument that the penalty should be up-
held because plaintiff had "notice" of potential liability through de-
fendant's regulation. The court noted that while the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA) does not establish an independent basis for ju-
risdiction in the claims court over such an action, the APA provides
guidelines for determining when and how it may review agency action
when plaintiffs bring claims for monetary damages stemming from
agency action. The court further noted that in cases where plaintiffs
allege agency action exceeded the authority delegated by Congress,
courts should accord only limited deference to the agency's interpreta-
tion of a statute.
Abound Corp. v. United States'34 involved the 1986 and 1987
price support and production adjustment programs for wheat and feed
grains. Plaintiffs' attempt to obtain limited discovery in the claims
court was denied, and the government's ruling that plaintiffs adopted a
"scheme and device to evade payment limitation regulations" was
thereafter upheld on cross-motions for summary judgment and affirmed
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 35 Plaintiffs also
argued that the administrative decision in the case was based on new
rules implemented by defendant, of which plaintiffs had no advance
knowledge because they were in the federal register, but not included
in the regulations or circulated to farmers. The court ruled that plain-
tiffs should have known of the new rules (even though they were never
formally published or circulated to farmers) because defendant had ad-
vised plaintiffs of the rule changes orally and (after plaintiffs had
signed the contract) by letter.
In Martin v. United States,1 36 plaintiff dairy farmer sought to en-
force his dairy termination program contract with defendant and re-
ceive payment under the contract even though DASCO found plaintiff
ineligible to receive compensation. The court, applying the "rational
134. No. 739-88C (CI. Ct. June 22, 1990).
135. Abound Corp. v. United States, 940 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
136. 20 CI. Ct. 738 (1990).
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basis" test, upheld defendant's finding that plaintiff was ineligible to
receive payment under the contract due to substantial violations of the
contract. The court further held DASCO's decision rationally con-
nected to the facts and evidence and affirmed that plaintiff violated the
contract by failing to export or slaughter the cows located on his farm
on the bid date.
Stevens v. United States'37 was a 1986 wheat price support and
production adjustment program case. Plaintiffs' application for partici-
pation in the program was originally approved by the state committee,
but was later denied. The court noted various inconsistencies within the
administrative record, but still upheld DASCO's final decision. The
court held that the doctrines of equitable estoppel and contract im-
plied-in-law cannot form the basis for a money claim against the U.S.
government and rejected plaintiffs' claims that there was an express
contract, or alternatively, an implied-in-fact contract, formed between
the parties which defendant breached. This case is an excellent exam-
ple of an administrative record replete with errors by defendant which
the court refused to review in a due process-equity mode.
Defendant has also been successful in streamlining issues found in
complex cases into a more simplified format upon which the U.S.
Claims Court can rule. In Rieschick v. United States3 8 the court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and denied plain-
tiffs' motion for transfer to the district court or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment. Defendant argued that since plaintiffs sought
money damages in excess of $10,000, and because there were no genu-
ine issues of material fact in dispute, defendant was entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs moved to return the case to the
district court where plaintiffs originally brought the case,1"9 alleging
that the U.S. claims court lacked jurisdiction to hear their claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief. In the alternative, plaintiffs moved for
summary judgment, alleging that the Secretary of Agriculture's pro-
mulgation of title 7 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part
1430.455(c)(1), a preliminary milk base reduction provision, was un-
lawful, and its application to plaintiffs' dairy termination program con-
tract, due to the presence of a contrary, informal policy (allowing some
137. 21 Cl. Ct. 195 (1990).
138. 21 Cl. Ct. 621 (1990).
139. Id. at 622-24. The U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas transferred the case
to the claims court by order of August 31, 1988, holding that the claims court had exclusive
jurisdiction pursuant to the Tucker Act. Id. at 622.
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milk producers to escape the milk base reduction regulation) was arbi-
trary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. In determining whether
this case rightfully belonged in the district court or the claims court,
Judge Robinson examined the factual allegations of the complaint
rather than the framing of plaintiffs' claims for relief and concluded
the case was, in essence, a contract dispute. Defendant's motion was
then granted based on the court's finding that the regulations were per-
missible and that defendant's refusal to apply informal policy allowing
some producers to escape reduction provisions of the regulations was
also reasonable.
In the last case of 1990, Doko Farms v. United States,14 cotton
farmers sought return of cancelled cotton allotments, release of funds
owed them, and removal from the government's debt register. All these
remedies were based on their contract for participation in the cotton
price support program. This case has a long procedural history which
includes four decisions from the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas, two decisions by the claims court, two decisions by the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and one by the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit. The decisions are summarized as follows:
(1) the government filed suit against Doko Farms (and other parties) in
federal district court to recover excessive payments based upon an
agency determination that Doko Farms and others had violated pro-
gram requirements. Doko Farms counterclaimed to remove their names
from the federal debt register, return all cancelled cotton allotments,
and release money due Doko Farms based on participation in other
programs. The district court found that the government's suit was
barred by the statute of limitations and that the regulation upon which
the agency decision was based was unconstitutionally vague and over-
broad. The court entered judgment for Doko Farms and severed Doko's
counterclaim to be tried separately;141 (2) the district court then heard
Doko's motion for summary judgment on its severed counterclaim and
again entered judgment for Doko Farms finding no legal basis for re-
tention of monies owed Doko Farms based on the court's earlier ruling
of no liability for alleged overpayments;142 (3) the government appealed
the decision on Doko's counterclaim to the Fifth Circuit, which af-
firmed the district court's original decision on the government's suit
140. 21 CI. Ct. 696 (1990).
141. United States v. Doko Farms, No. CA-5-79-72 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
142. Doko Farms v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 867 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
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against Doko Farms and reversed and remanded the case to the district
court, ordering the lower court to establish jurisdiction over Doko's
counterclaims (a separate case by virtue of the severance); 143 (4) on
remand, the district court held it had jurisdiction to grant Doko the
relief it sought in the counterclaim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1361;"'4
(5) the government again appealed to the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Cir-
cuit ruled that the claims court, and not the district court, had exclu-
sive jurisdiction over Doko's counterclaim, granting Doko Farms leave
to refile the case in the claims court;"15 (6) Doko Farms then filed its
case in the U.S. Claims Court, and the government counterclaimed.
The claims court held that it did not have jurisdiction over government
claims for money damages against private parties, or Doko's claim for
equitable relief. Therefore, the court transferred the action back to the
district court where it originated;" (7) the district court, handling the
case for the fourth time, granted Doko Farms' motion for summary
judgment and denied the government's motion for summary judgment
on its counterclaim;" 47 (8) the government again appealed the district
court's decision, this time to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, ar-
guing that jurisdiction was proper in the claims court rather than the
district court. The Federal Circuit held that the Fifth Circuit's finding
of exclusive jurisdiction in the U.S. Claims Court was the law of the
case, and retransferred the case to the U.S. Claims Court;"48 (9) fi-
nally, the case was again before the claims court, in which Doko Farms
was found entitled to judgment based on the res judicata effect of the
prior action which had been brought by the government in the district
court to recover allegedly excessive subsidy payments. In sum, it took
the farmers seven years of litigation to obtain relief.
C. Comparison with Recent U.S. District Court Agricultural Deci-
sions, 1981 to 1991
In the period 1987 to 1991,' " federal district courts decided im-
143. United States v. O'Neil, 709 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1983).
144. Doko Farms v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 867 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
145. United States v. O'Neil, 767 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1985).
146. Doko Farms v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 48 (1987).
147. Doko Farms v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 867 (N.D. Tex. 1984).
148. Doko Farms v. United States, 861 F.2d 255 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
149. In 1982, a group of individuals brought a class action challenging USDA's failure to
implement a loan program. The court both certified the class and found defendant's failure to
implement the program arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. The court reversed de-
fendant's prior decision in which the Secretary had declined to implement the program. Kjeldahl
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portant agricultural issues arising from federal farm programs. In those
cases, a number of farmers obtained meaningful substantive relief far
beyond that ever granted in the U.S. Claims Court.
In 1987, the USDA was battling large farmers over the new con-
servation reserve program (CRP). In a case entitled Esch v. Lyng,150
plaintiff farmers sued the USDA, challenging their suspension from the
federal farm programs, including the CRP program in which they had
enrolled some 20,000 acres.
In Esch, the USDA determined that nine brothers and sisters were
only one "person" for payment limitation purposes.151 Without prior
notice, the USDA suspended the Esch family from participation in the
farm programs and withheld payments. As a result, creditors repos-
sessed their farm equipment, and their lenders instituted foreclosure.
Plaintiffs were denied relief before the county and state ASCS commit-
tees and were not apprised of the official reasons for their suspension
until they reached DASCO.
In U.S. District Court, plaintiffs could have brought an action for
damages. To avoid a Tucker Act motion to transfer, however, they
asked only for equitable relief: (1) injunctive relief, prohibiting the Sec-
retary from suspending their participation in the farm program as nine
"persons," (2) a declaration that they were eligible to participate as
nine "persons," and (3) an order pursuant to the APA that the ASCS's
"person" determination was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of
due process, and unwarranted by the facts.
U.S. District Court Judge Joyce Hens Green acknowledged that
the claims court would have exclusive jurisdiction if "the primary ob-
ject of a suit [was] to recover money damages .. .in excess of $10,000
... "I The court noted, however, that if a plaintiff seeks equitable
relief that would have "significant prospective effect or considerable
value," the district court could assume jurisdiction over the non-mone-
tary claims. 53
Plaintiffs provided evidence that a preliminary injunction would
v. Block, 579 F. Supp. 1130 (D.D.C. 1983). In that case, Judge Joyce Hens Green granted plain-
tiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and enjoined the Secretary from making any dis-
bursements from the fund. This use of injunctive powers became a predecessor to actions Judge
Green would take a few years later in a number of key agricultural cases.
150. 665 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1987), affid as modified sub nom. Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d
976 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
151. Id. at 10.
152. Id. at 11.
153. Id. (quoting Noot v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 852, 853 (8th Cir. 1983)).
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"immediately inure to their benefit by placating creditors who at the
moment [were] threatening to shut down plaintiffs' farm." 154 The court
ruled defendants had denied the plaintiffs a fair and impartial adminis-
trative hearing and that the decision was reached in the absence of due
process. Thus, plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction was
granted. 55
The government appealed. Two years later, in 1989, the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's deci-
sion in Esch v. Lyng.156 The decision negated the USDA's long stand-
ing argument that farm subsidy disputes are contract claims within the
meaning of the Tucker Act:
If appellees' suit is not based on a contract with the Federal Govern-
ment, it cannot lie within the Claims Court's contractual jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a). Although appellees signed "contracts" with
the Federal Government, and although the Department's regulations
denominate the documents executed by the Federal Government and
program participants as "contracts," see 7 C.F.R. § 704.1 (1988)
(conservation reserve program); id §§ 713.49, 713.50 (1988) (price
support program), we see no reason to assume that what is involved
here is a contract within the meaning of the Tucker Act. As the Su-
preme Court recently noted "[u]nlike normal contractual undertak-
ings, federal grant programs originate in and remain governed by stat-
utory provisions expressing the judgment of Congress concerning
desirable public policy." [Appellees'] claims arise under a federal
grant program and turn on the interpretation of statutes and regula-
tions rather than on the interpretation of an agreement negotiated by
the parties. It seems to us, then, that [appellees'] claims are not con-
tract claims for Tucker Act purposes.
15 7
The court also relied upon the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Bowen v. Massachusetts,158 which ruled that the U.S. Claims Court
has inadequate procedures to displace the district court's APA jurisdic-
tion over agricultural cases:
[I]t is doubtful that the jurisdictional power of the Claims Court ex-
tends to the suit in question. Appellees, we repeat, assert no claim for
154. Id. at 12.
155. Id. at 15.
156. Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
157. Id. at 978 n.13 (quoting Maryland Dep't of Human Resources v. Department of
Health and Human Serv., 763 F.2d 1441, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
. 158. 487 U.S. 879 (1988).
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a sum immediately due and owing by the Federal Government. The
statute undergirding their suit does not mandate compensation. Simi-
larly to the one involved in Bowen, it "directs the Secretary to pay
money[,J . . . not as compensation for a past wrong, but to subsidize
future . . . expenditures." Nor do appellees predicate their bid for
relief upon the provisions of the contract they have negotiated with
the Department of Agriculture. And, like the Bowen Court, we believe
that district courts are better equipped to understand and evaluate the
various factual circumstance of these cases than is the Claims Court,
headquartered in Washington, far removed from the controversy, and
inconvenient to most of those likely to become litigants. Accordingly,
we conclude that the Claims Court does not possess the kind of review
procedures which would displace the District Court's APA jurisdic-
tion over appellees' suit. "
The circuit court followed the Supreme Court's two-part test in
Bowen, 60 involving an analysis of sections 702161 and 70462 of the
APA, and concluded the district court possessed jurisdiction.
1 63
Esch thus opened the door to U.S. District Court jurisdiction over
farm subsidy cases. The Tucker Act no longer precludes review of the
USDA's actions when the relief sought is other than money damages,
even if the relief forms the basis for a money judgment.
A few months after Judge Green's decision in Esch v. Lyng, but
before the District of Columbia Circuit's affirmance in Esch v. Yeutter,
another subsidy case came before the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia. In Baker v. Lyng,161 plaintiffs sought: (1) prelimi-
nary and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting the Secretary from
suspending their participation in the farm program, (2) a declaration
that they were eligible to participate, and (3) an order pursuant to set-
ting aside the ASCS's person determination as arbitrary and capri-
159. Esch, 876 F.2d at 985.
160. In Bowen, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that any action against the Gov-
ernment for money damages must be brought in the claims court. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 904-05.
161. Addressing the § 702 inquiry, the court noted that appellees sought an injunction
against an arbitrary or capricious administrative denial of subsidy payments due them and held
this suit for relief was "certainly not an action for money damages." Esch, 876 F.2d at 984 (citing
Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. at 893).
162. In its § 704 analysis, the court doubted whether the claims court could provide the
Esches with an adequate review procedure that would oust the district court of its jurisdiction
under the APA, because, inter alia, the claims court lacked jurisdiction to award injunctive relief.
Id. at 984.
163. Id. at 983.
164. No. 87-1643-LFO, 1987 WL 123789 (D.D.C., Aug. 4, 1987).
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cious, in violation of due process, and unwarranted by the facts.
The USDA contended that plaintiffs were seeking money damages
and that the case should be dismissed because it fell within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the U.S. Claims Court. The court granted defend-
ant's motion to dismiss, finding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The court characterized the case as one based on a contract with the
government and relied on the CCC anti-injunction statute, 15 U.S.C. §
714b(c), as the grounds for dismissal. The court concluded that what
plaintiffs sought was, in essence, an injunction against CCC, 16 5 which
was prohibited by statute.
Baker v. Lyng was in direct conflict with Esch v. Lyng and was a
blow to farmers. Less than two years later, however, Esch v. Lyng was
upheld in Esch v. Yeutter, negating the short term negative impact of
Baker."'6
Women Involved in Farm Economics v. United States Department
of Agriculture,1 6 7 challenged the USDA regulation treating a husband
and wife as one "person" for purpose of the $50,000 payment limita-
tion applicable to most of the federal farm programs. The district court
(again Judge Joyce Hens Green), ruling on cross-motions for summary
judgment, found the regulation unconstitutionally discriminatory on the
basis of marital status and not rationally related to the achievement of
a legitimate government purpose.
The court found that the regulation excluded married women from
participation in the program and undermined the basic purpose of the
program, i.e., to reduce the quantity of planted acreage of certain
crops.
The case illustrates that review of a USDA regulation is obtaina-
ble in federal district court, but not in the U.S. Claims Court. The
claims court cannot grant declaratory relief and seldom reviews the
constitutionality of a regulation, preferring to address only substantive
contract issues.
Tom's Foods Inc. v. Lyng 68 was a traditional challenge of a
USDA program. Plaintiff, a food distributor, appealed a penalty im-
165. The court ignored the distinction between the ASCS, the entity which plaintiffs were
attempting to enjoin, and CCC, the entity addressed in the statute.
166. See also Vandervelde v. Yeutter, 774 F.Supp. 645, 648-49 (D.D.C. 1991), wherein
Judge Oberdorfer distinguishes his earlier ruling in Baker and sides with Esch v. Lyng, holding
that district courts can and should review these types of federal program cases.
167. 682 F. Supp. 599 (D.D.C. 1988).
168. 703 F. Supp. 1562 (M.D. Ga. 1989).
[Vol. 15:223
AGRICULTURAL LAW
posed for violation of peanut price support regulations. After having
made an APA review, the court granted plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, ruling that plaintiff did not violate the price support regula-
tions, that the penalty assessed was void and unenforceable, and that
the USDA was equitably estopped. Again, the district court demon-
strated that relief was available as long as damages were abandoned as
a remedy.
In Justice v. Lyng,18 9 plaintiffs sought declaratory relief regarding
their eligibility to participate in an ASCS program. The USDA raised
its usual defense that a judgment would result in money damages in
excess of $10,000. The court disagreed and found plaintiffs' action was
not an action for actual presently owed monies, but rather an action
seeking a determination that plaintiffs were eligible to participate in a
federal farm program from which benefits could be earned. The court
granted plaintiffs' injunctive relief, in effect placing plaintiffs back in
the program and making them eligible for payment.
Farmers could now sue for injunctive relief to compel prospective
payments and not be forced into the U.S. Claims Court. The USDA
responded with some new defenses.
In Justice v. Lyng, the USDA raised the "Charter Act Defense."
The CCC, a federal corporation 1 70 has authority to implement farm
programs. The USDA contended that any lawsuit involving farm sub-
sidy monies (CCC funds) must have a basis for jurisdiction in federal
district court separate from the CCC's Charter Act.17 1 Although the
jurisdictional argument was defeated in Justice v. Lyng, a few courts
have held that actions involving CCC-funded programs must be
brought in the claims court when the amount of relief sought exceeds
$10,000.172
The USDA also relied upon a second section of the CCC Charter
Act to keep farmers out of U.S. District Court whenever the farmer's
complaint pleads for injunctive relief. The Charter Act's "anti-injunc-
tion" provision states that CCC "[m]ay sue and be sued, but no attach-
ment, injunction, garnishment, or other similar process . . . shall be
169. 716 F. Supp. 1570 (D. Ariz. 1989).
170. 15 U.S.C. §§ 714-714b (1988).
171. Id. at § 714b(c).
172. See United States v. O'Neil, 767 F.2d 1111, 1113 (5th Cir. 1985); Amalgamated
Sugar Co. v. Bergland, 664 F.2d 818, 823 (10th Cir. 1981); Gibson v. Block, 619 F. Supp. 1572,
1575 (N.D. Ind. 1985); Raines v. Block, 599 F. Supp. 196, 198 (D. Colo. 1984); Raines v. United
States, 12 Cl. Ct. 530, 534 (1987); Gibson v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 6, I1 (1986); Pettersen v.
United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 194, 197, af'd, 807 F.2d 993 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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issued against the Corporation or its property." ' This argument was
successfully used by the USDA in Baker v. Lyng and in other cases, 174
but has not been universally accepted. 75
In one of a series of disaster act cases, plaintiff in Vculek v. Yeut-
ter,171 challenged the USDA's determination that he was ineligible for
farm disaster payments. Defendant moved for summary judgment. Al-
though the court granted defendant's motion, holding that the USDA's
determination was not arbitrary and capricious, it rejected defendant's
argument that plaintiff's claim be dismissed for failure to have a third
and final administrative hearing. The court noted that the exhaustion
of administrative remedies doctrine need not be applied inflexibly and
is subject to exceptions. The court did not require plaintiff to appeal his
case to DASCO since he had already appealed at the county and state
level, and there were no facts in dispute. The court held that requiring
a third administrative determination would be redundant. This analysis
was typical of those found in district courts in the late 1980s when
courts focused on the substance of the problem as opposed to the proce-
dural requirements.
In a case litigated throughout 1990 and ruled on in early 1991,
DCP Farms v. Yeutter,1 7 7 (also the subject of a television story on 60
Minutes in December 1991), due process of the USDA's appeals sys-
tem was again before the federal court. Plaintiffs challenged the
USDA's 1990 determinations which found plaintiffs ineligible for farm
program benefits for three crop years (1989, 1990, and 1991), as inva-
lid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the
decisions were arrived at after congressional interference. Plaintiffs
proved that defendant had been lobbied heavily by a congressman pres-
suring defendant to deny plaintiffs' benefits. Plaintiffs further argued
that defendants' conduct had been arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, and contrary to the law, causing plaintiffs irreparable harm.
Defendant raised its traditional jurisdictional arguments in an attempt
to avoid litigating the case in U.S. District Court.
The first argument was to ask that the CCC be permitted to inter-
173. 15 U.S.C. § 714b(c) (1988).
174. See Stroud v. Benson, 254 F.2d 448, 450 (4th Cir. 1958); Moon v. Freeman, 245 F.
Supp. 837, 839 n.3 (E.D. Wash. 1965); Lazar v. Benson, 156 F. Supp. 259, 268 (E.D.S.C. 1957).
175. See Iowa ex. rel. Miller v. Block, 771 F.2d 347, 348 n.1 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1012 (1986); Justice v. Lyng, 716 F. Supp. 1567, 1569 (D. Ariz. 1988); Mitchell v.
Block, 551 F. Supp. 1011, 1015-16 (W.D. Va. 1982).
176. 754 F. Supp. 154 (D.N.D. 1990).
177. 761 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Miss. 1991), rev'd, 957 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1992).
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vene as a real party in interest. Defendant attempted to have CCC
intervene so that it could invoke the anti-injunction provision of the
CCC Charter Act, 15 U.S.C. § 714b(c), and thereby grant the USDA
immunity in matters involving injunctive relief, an effort previously
suggested in Justice v. Lyng. The court, as in Justice v. Lyng, rejected
defendants' argument and denied CCC's motion to intervene.
Defendants also argued that the court had no subject matter juris-
diction pursuant to the Tucker Act. The court noted that the Tucker
Act only applies to claims for monetary damages and that a district
court's review of claims for relief other than money damages (even if
such non-monetary relief may form the basis for a future money judg-
ment) is not limited by the Tucker Act's restriction on jurisdiction. The
court referenced Bowen v. Massachusetts"8 for its finding that while
the relief plaintiffs sought
may serve as a basis for monetary relief, it is not a substitute remedy
at all but an attempt to give the plaintiff the very thing to which he
was entitled in the first place and is not "money damages" as the term
is contemplated and used in the Tucker Act.179
This reasoning was parallel to the prior holdings in Esch v. Lyng and
Justice v. Lyng rejecting the application of the Tucker Act to suits for
equitable relief.
In one of the nation's largest dairy termination program (DTP)
cases, Vandervelde v. Yeutter,8 0 the court reaffirmed federal district
court jurisdiction in CCC/ASCS cases, originally established in Esch
v. Lyng and Esch v. Yeutter, and denied defendant's motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs requested review of the agency's action and injunctive and
declaratory relief alleging that defendant: (1) illegally suspended their
payments under their DTP contract, (2) denied them the right to par-
ticipate in the DTP in violation of law, (3) made an arbitrary and ca-
pricious determination, (4) violated their due process rights, (5) failed
to make factual findings in violation of the law and plaintiffs' contract,
and (6) took plaintiffs' property without compensation in violation of
the Fifth Amendment. Defendant moved to dismiss, contending that
the action, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on its face, was in
reality an action for money damages. Defendant further argued that
the case should be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the claims
178. 487 U.S. 879 (1988). See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
179. DCP Farms, 761 F. Supp. at 1274-75.
180. No. 90-1372-LFO (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 1992).
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court under the Tucker Act. The court denied defendant's motion, dis-
tancing itself from its earlier holding in Baker v. Lyng' s1 and noting
the many similarities between the case at bar and Esch.
Finally, the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona re-
cently decided Golightly v. Yeutter,1 82 in which it held DASCO's find-
ings to be unreasonable and lacking a rational basis when DASCO de-
nied some plaintiffs relief provided to other producers. DASCO had
found the plaintiff in Golightly had purposely indicated bank financing
rather than financing from a local ginning company on farm record in
an effort to avoid payment limitation provisions. The court found
DASCO's refusal to apply an exception for financing institutions to the
cotton gin to be arbitrary and capricious. The court further found
DASCO's determination that its "handbook" rule, allowing loans by
financial institutions, applied only to banks and lending institutions and
not cotton gins, was without basis in agency statutes or regulations.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the court held that DASCO
abused its discretion in relieving some but not all producers from the
penalty because no rational basis existed in the administrative record
for such selectivity.
V. CONCLUSION
This article illustrates that in but a few cases, farmers have not
obtained meaningful relief in the U.S. Claims Court. The major reason
is the U.S. Claims Court's limited jurisdiction; it has no injunctive or
declaratory powers. Without equitable jurisdiction, resolution of most
agricultural cases that require immediate or short-term relief to avoid
irreparable harm or declarations of a party's rights, are a practical im-
possibility. In addition, the U.S. Claims Court usually insists on resolu-
tion by summary judgment, which reduces the case to overly simplistic
issues of law and limits supplementation of the administrative record.
The court also gives strict deference to the USDA's determination,
even when the administrative procedure followed by the USDA lacks
normal due process. The U.S. Claims Court has a limited scope of re-
view: the "rational basis test," which is a test often too elementary for
federal farm program disputes and which leaves key issues of equity
generally ignored. Additionally, the court frequently refuses to examine
whether due process was followed in the eligibility process, a critical
181. No. 87-1643-LFO, 1987 WL 123789 (D.D.C. Aug. 4, 1987).
182. 780 F. Supp. 672 (D. Ariz. 1991).
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issue since many USDA programs change each year. The U.S. Claims
Court has consistently refused to allow supplementation of the adminis-
trative record, which is often devoid of critical pro-farmer evidence.
Furthermore, the court often uses the lack of administrative procedural
requirements, such. as the exhaustion of administrative remedies, to
avoid discussing substantive issues. Finally, the court prefers, when a
plaintiff farmer has proven he has been wronged, to remand the case to
the USDA for a new hearing rather than to grant judgment to the
plaintiff farmer; a remand often does no more than provide the USDA
a second opportunity to strengthen its findings against the farmer.
Farmers will want their cases reviewed in U.S. District Court in-
stead of the U.S. Claims Court. To accomplish this, the case must be
pled carefully and should adhere to the following general guidelines:
(1) do not plead a breach of contract count, (2) plead for equitable
relief-injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment, (3) do not include
the Commodity Credit Corporation as a defendant-the sole defendant
need be only the Secretary of the USDA, (4) challenge the administra-
tive record, and (5) carefully challenge and plead all APA and due
process issues, including whether the farmer received a full opportunity
to submit and rebut all evidence cited against him. Taking these pre-
cautions will hopefully ensure a review in the U.S. District Court, ena-
bling the farmer to receive more complete and expedient relief.
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